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Abstract: These brief considerations are meant to reflect on the significance that the idea of Subject 
has acquired in the present day, so as to shed some light onto what it implies for pedagogic 
epistemology. This investigative hypothesis defines the subject in terms of the way in which it 
interrelates with the world. Presently, subjectivity has to face technoscientific approaches, since the 
latter define contemporary society. Thence rises the contrast with the idea of subject rooting in 
complex transhumanistic cogitations. 
To this end, this paper will attempt to unravel the various meanings attributed to the concept of 
subject, in relation to the changes the world is facing in our days. Finally, it will try to determine the 
extent to which subject and technology intertwine, through processes of reciprocal determination. 
Keywords: transhumanism, subject, pedagogic epistemology. 
  
Resumen: Este artículo trata del significado que la idea de sujeto ha adquirido actualmente y de sus 
implicaciones para una epistemología pedagógica. La hipótesis inicial define al sujeto según el modo 
de su interrelación con el mundo. En el momento presente, la noción de subjetividad se enfrenta con 
ciertas aproximaciones de carácter tecnológico, dado que esto último define a la sociedad 
contemporánea, estableciéndose un contraste con la idea de sujeto enraizada en la compleja visión 
transhumanista. A tal fin, se intentará desentrañar los diversos significados atribuidos al concepto de 
sujeto en relación a los cambios con los que el mundo actual se confronta. Finalmente, se tratará de 
mostrar  hasta qué punto se entrecruzan sujeto y tecnología, a través de sus procesos de 
determinación recíproca. 
Palabras claves: transhumanismo, sujeto, epistemología pedagógica. 
 
 
Introductory considerations 
 
When reflecting about the Subject through the language of knowledge 
epistemology, a procedure of differentiation takes place. This topic requires 
thought to be a process of patient discernment. This is because the spectrum of 
meaning concerning this topos is wide and highly varied. A possible framework 
for the variety of definitions of Subject is Conscience, as Decartes teaches us. 
There is, in fact, no other form of thought than the distinct, self-evident, and 
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conscious one that Decartes suggests. Thence, the Cogito ergo sum establishes a 
relation between thought and thinker. In this perspective, the Subject corresponds 
to Conscience, and thus to thought. 
Nonetheless, Conscience is conceived of as a vigilant need for cognitive 
action, or, in Whitehead’s (1945) words, as “perceiving itself as percipient”. This 
Conscience, which justifies the Subject, is a process. A relational process. A 
creative creation. In fact, when we reflect on the Subject we immediately feel a 
need for stable grounds, and in this very need roots the Subject’s history, as 
Greek ontology teaches us. However, the Conscience’s wavering dynamism 
instantly obstructs this process, together with the groundlessness of the world in 
which it flourishes. The latter is determined and constituted by change and 
difference. As a matter of fact, we only know the world through our own 
perception, which is translated into symbols by the Conscience (1929). 
When searching for an effective synthesis of Cartesian rationalism and 
English empiricism, Kant reached the “Copernican revolution” that places the 
subject at the basis of knowledge. Here, human faculties (a priori forms of 
sensitivity and intellect) come to determine the object in its “phenomenality”. 
Knowledge is justifiable according to logic only within this limit.  In reality, the 
extra-phenomenical is out of the reach of our specific detection processes. By 
applying its own formal instruments to experience, science provides the subject 
with a central role. This is then reinforced both in the ethical and aesthetic 
domain. In relation to the former, the German philosopher claims that man is “a 
rule to himself”, since his will is self-legislative. Therefore, his morals cannot be 
externally influenced, either by religion or politics, whereas in relation to the 
latter, he asserts that beauty is not an objective or ontological element of things, 
but rather the meeting point between them and our spirit. Consequently, nature’s 
beauty may only be rendered formally harmonic by our own mind, through 
artistic expression. 
The contribution of Kant’s genius to scientific, ethical and aesthetic 
knowledge seems sufficiently obvious. Moreover, he recognizes the constant 
stimulus, provided by metaphysics – which he himself so lucidly critiques –, to 
proceed and explore the possibilities beyond what is known. 
The processes of learning and determining subjectivity obey profound 
pedagogic semantics, as well as the meaning and sense of the sciences that study 
them. This paper aims at reflecting on this profound semantics, by means of the 
“theoretical place” called Subject. 
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The Subject in crisis 
 
During the 20th century, Husserl’s phenomenology highlighted rather effectively 
the grounds of the Western world’s “crisis”. This crisis rooted in the loss of 
importance of the cognitive model of objectivism. The latter, ever since Galileo, 
symbolized reality according to a physic-mathematic construction. Hence, it 
neglected the Lebenswelt, in other words the world consisting of human beings’ 
concrete existence. Husserl (1968) is not an epistemologist aiming at challenging 
the scientific base of sciences applied in their naturalistic model. He is strongly 
convinced of their explanatory power, yet innovatively and radically affirms that 
this science has lost sight of its real objective: man as a subject of free will, able 
to apply his rational right to modify the world. In other words, the pivotal role of 
the human subject, which must be re-established. 
Therefore, sciences present a sort of extraneousness towards existence, which 
produces distrust or even hostility. They do not seem able to grasp the necessities 
or questions that men have in relation to their destiny. Consequently, they fail to 
guide towards the debates between the meaning and non-meaning of human 
existence in its entirety. Might this perhaps depend on the fact that they have 
exhausted the potential applicability, productivity, progress, and wellbeing that 
they can provide? Husserl maintains this categorically. Moreover, he specifically 
believes that they are missing the pre-scientific, pre-logic grounds of the existing 
life-world, defined as a reign of original evidence. Hence, the need for a new 
science: phenomenology, which must aim at steering subjectivity towards the 
meaning of existence. It is a philosophical science that can “reveal” humanity to 
itself as a “phenomenon”. Its role is specifically challenging, as it must bring 
back to the surface what has been hidden, and render it comprehensible: man as a 
subject, which cannot be understood by any other science due to their reciprocal 
seclusion. Not even psychology can achieve this goal, since it has also 
established itself as a science of facts. Phenomenology intends to be an eidetic 
science of structures, requiring the discontinuing of the usual scientific 
acceptance of reality. Indeed, it intends to focus our attention on conscience and 
its intentional acts, as well as the manners in which it takes over reality. The 
phenomenological researcher becomes disinterested in facts, but rather learns to 
capture the essences revealed by reason. The latter is a privileged philosophical 
tool, and can explain the various ways in which the being manifests itself. 
Subsequently, scientific rationality does not belong to any specific science or 
method of research, in that it “must be about man and man’s history in its 
entirety” (E. Paci, 1970, p. 332). In that sense, it can be affirmed that life does 
not find its meaning in science, but rather science recognizes its own grounds in 
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life. Phenomenological conscience can never be as absolute as progressive 
reconstruction in Hegel’s renowned Phenomenology. Indeed, the former is 
always conscience “of something”, thus presenting a clear relativistic matrix. 
This “philosophical root” imprinted by Husserl turns out to be particularly fertile 
in psychological and sociological studies during the second half of the 20th 
century. From a critical need for knowledge emerged a perspective dense with 
meanings: a wisdom that has become approximate, relativistic, and lacking 
definition in its confrontation with the phenomenal reality (that which appears). 
So-called “existential psychology”, for example, does not even believe it can 
interpret the world of subjective experiences. It chooses to limit itself to the 
search for traces of experiences, emotions, symbols, etc., by means of an 
empathetic method. The researcher must enter the other’s world with a constant 
participatory tension, as Maslow and Rogers show us. 
The prominence of scholars quoted in today’s adult educational practices 
demonstrates a specific link between phenomenology and pedagogy; yet this 
relation is even further highlighted by Paulo Freire’s theoretical and practical 
work, which recovers, from phenomenology, the pivotal role of conscience’s 
intentionality. For Husserl, the subject is always conscience, experience, or 
perception of something; it is a cogito, and the cogitata are the produce of 
subjective intention. In relation with intentional modality, the cogitata may 
appear as real, imaginary, possible, etc. However, especially when the subject 
intentionally approaches the other, it produces inter-subjectivity. This should be 
considered as teleological, in that its purpose is the creation of a society of 
subjects. Moreover, intentionality is not only inspired by the present, but also 
reconnects with the past and prefigures the future: it is conscience of the flow of 
experience through time (Erlebnisstrom). According to Freire, the conscience is 
“method” and “journey” towards an intentionally identified beyond. It is an 
ideal, and at the same time a concrete project which grows in relation to 
profound maieutic connotations. This process is represented by the culture circle, 
which is not a place, but rather an educational occasion. An occasion where no-
one is at the center, but rather everyone equally participates in the definition of 
learning processes to be pursued. These words bring to mind the urgency of the 
Exodus, which Ernst Bloch (1972) considered to be the peculiar and inescapable 
nature of all humanization: freedom from the domination that Freire so 
passionately proclaimed, placing at the center of the emancipation of the 
oppressed the explosive power of dialogue. The latter represents not only a tool 
for awareness-raising, but also an operation of transformation of the world, since 
there is no authentic word that is not also practice. 
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This paper also argues that the Subject, far from once and for all creating its 
identity and immutability, is a dynamic and creative system. It is the sub-jectum 
basis: the grounds for both knowledge and ethics. This is because it carries the 
object of knowledge, and, consequently, its related behavioural choices, through 
its own cognitive forms. The forms of “formalized” knowledge, i.e. translated 
into a coherent set of symbols, attend to language. Meanings are configured 
within the game of language. In this sense, it can be asserted that thought is 
narrative, in that it tries to harness reality into linguistic forms that translate into 
functional interpretative schemes. Ergo, since its cognitive action on the world 
has a notably linguistic approach, the Subject’s creativity is of an eminently 
hermeneutic nature. Reality is a text to be interpreted. “It is the very same 
discourse practices”, writes Salvatore Natoli (2010, p.11), “that trace, time after 
time, their own boundaries. And yet always trespass them. Reason takes and 
gives shape, in fact depicts what happens in discourse. Whilst discerning, it 
inevitably demarcates. Whilst demarcating, it interprets”. Nonetheless, as sub-
jectum – in other words, as an element that sustains, founds and is subjected, 
through its own interpretative forms, to knowledge –, its hermeneutics 
paradoxically roots in its ontology.  
This ontology does not only concern the observable epistemic fact that has 
been pointed out – in other words, its essentiality in processes of construction of 
a knowledge that can only exist in relation to the Subject. On the contrary, it also 
concerns the procedural and relational nature of the creation of subjectivity. 
Indeed, the Relation is the ontological principle of the Subject, existence, 
knowledge, and life itself. The Relation is the total matrix, since without 
Relation existence, reality and life cannot be read, interpreted or understood. 
Without this conceptualization, we cannot effectively explain either the nature of 
conscience, or the meaning of our existence in the world. To sum up, without the 
Relation as explanatory principle of things, we are not able to orient ourselves in 
the symbolic multiversum in which we live. Thence, the multiple dimensions of 
the Subject and its varied affiliations; and, consequently, the pivotal role of 
another present-day icon: interculturality. From this, its anthropological 
implication: when thinking of the subject, we automatically think of each single 
individual. In this way, this topos brings to the same level the principle of 
identity and that of diversity. Just as any conceptualization whose nature 
condensates meanings into an unicum, which nonetheless implies, according to 
Derrida (1967; 1972), the refutal of its many differences and dissemination of its 
many contents. The process of identification of the subject decentralizes itself in 
the world, with infinite historical-material differences. In those determinations 
the subject identifies itself with the individual. In short, this paper argues that the 
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subject is determined in an educational, multirelational and multidirectional 
process, which favors knowledge in its linguistic representations. Despite both 
Subject and language being self-defining, technology nowadays assumes a 
crucial role in this game. 
All of this has many consequences in the field of educational epistemology. 
Indeed, a determined conception of subject defines the idea of its constructive 
processes, just as a determined conception of reality defines a determined theory 
of knowledge. Finally, knowledge itself is related to the idea of logos, a 
dominant conception in our cognitive traditions since Plato, thus dictating the 
most consolidated educational practices. 
 
 
The dissolution 
 
With his Metaphysics, Aristotle delivered to us the Subject as foundation. The 
“first philosophy” is, in fact, a science that investigates, postulates and sets the 
“foundation”, despite the fact that such incontrovertible truth may never be fully 
acquired. The sub-jectum is the structure of reality, a base that sustains what 
would otherwise collapse. According to Heidegger (1984), the entity, as entity, is 
a sub-jectum. Something that pre-exists in terms of itself, and as such is also at 
the basis of its constant properties and changing states. It is a uniform and 
permanent element, principle and fact, paradigm of logic around which the 
notion which has reached modern times constituted itself, and with which we are 
still dealing nowadays. Aristotle and Descartes have carved this idea of Subject 
into our epistemologic tradition. Nonetheless, this idea of subject as foundation 
implies the existence of a foundation. Therefore, the existence of a reality with 
founding structures. Ergo, it implies the existence of an ultimate, incontrovertible 
truth. In this context, knowledge is none other than the uncovering of a truth-
reality, whose profound signification nodes are its own foundation. 
Consequently, what is needed is to find the correct method and exact procedure 
to apply the very laws of this “discovered” reality. Reality consists in what is 
rationally argued about it. As Bateson (1979) would say, the map blends into the 
landscape. Hence, education is the teaching of the logos, and knowledge is in the 
foundation. The Subject must not build it, but only look for it. Why? Because it 
is. The Subject is, reality is. They are both permanent, universal facts. Knowing 
is to render reality comprehensible. Thus, knowledge is adherent to the world, 
rather than its description, interpretation, set of explanations, or construction. 
Subject and world are uniform paradigms, inside which all their differences 
vibrate. They may be applied to each individual declination, but can never be 
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fully identifiable with any one of them. The foundation is a stable principle, an 
essence and not a process, and thus it exists independently of the Relation. In this 
context, our educational traditions have taught us to think by identifying and 
separating phenomena, and concentrating on things rather than on relations. The 
Galilean application of a science which creates separations is born precisely of 
the perfectioning of the classic epistemologic model. In epistemology, as in 
scientific research, the disjunctive analytical method, specialistic separation, 
knowledge dichotomy, and the abstract model have been favoured. 
At the heart of this cognitive approach, and of the educational theories that 
derive from it, is the idea of Subject as uniform and permanent foundation. It is 
on these fundamenta that modernity has been built; and it is with the crumbling 
of these fundamenta that modernity flakes, as Lyotard (1979) would say, into 
many small and singular narrations. 
The postmodern or late modernity, liquid modernity, is none other than the 
shattering of Bauman’s concept of foundation (1992). With the dissolution of 
modernity, the unit of epistemology and educational theorizing is no longer the 
Subject-foundation, but rather the interactive and dynamic relationality that binds 
the Subject to its environment. From reality’s groundlessness, we reach the 
notion of Subject as a small ecosystem, at the same time included into and 
englobing a wider set of interrelations. Uniqueness is dissolved into relation, 
stability into dynamism. 
Nevertheless, some further thought-provoking dissolutions exist: the subject 
is not only a relational dance that transforms it, while it interconnects it to the 
world. The subject is not only the entity that perceives to be perceiving, in other 
words, conscience and consciousness: it is also technical self-renovation and 
self-transformation. According to Peter Soloterdijk (2009), education itself is a 
“transformative” technique of the human being whose purpose is the 
optimization of his/her potentials. It is an anthropo-technique which aims at 
exceeding oneself, in the sense that one tries to overtake one’s own starting 
limits, by highlighting one’s initial abilities and influencing their positive 
evolution. Education could thus strengthen the human’s intellectual activity and 
physical performance, allowing him/her to acquire new abilities and new powers 
for intervening on the world. In light of these considerations, which can largely 
be generalized to Transhumanist thought, it can be stated that the subject defines 
itself according to the extent to which it has exceeded itself. Its relation to the 
world is defined in terms of its power over the world. In this sense, it can be 
argued that Soloterdijk’s transhuman subject is definable in its being in 
transition, and that its world is the object of its “transformations”. As previously 
mentioned, Soloterdijk is but one of the outstanding representatives of this 
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movement. Above all, he theorizes about  “a humanity radically transformed by 
future technology”, as claimed by the first principle of Transhumanistic texts of 
the Association of Italian Transhumanists. What does this statement concretely 
mean? And which consequences does it imply for the general idea of subject and 
body? Asking ourselves these questions is not at all a mere academic exercise. In 
fact, the answers that will be elaborated will directly give roots to the 
educational, political and existential choices that will be made. 
The possibility, or rather, the certainty that technology will forge a new 
humanity, implies the taking on of the responsibility to “re-design the human 
condition”. The purposes of this design are to “avoid the inevitable ageing 
process, and the limitations of human intellect”. The ethical background of these 
presuppositions is related to “the individual right to expand one’s own 
intellectual and physical capacities, and to increase one’s control over one’s own 
life”, in other words: “a personal growth beyond the biological limitations by 
which we are bound”. Finally, the seventh principle states that “transhumanism 
provides wellbeing to all sentient beings (be they human, artificial intelligence, 
animal, or even extraterrestrial)”. The human subject is, therefore, a sentient 
being, which has been thoroughly consolidated. However, in this framework, 
also artifical intelligence, (all?) animals, and (humanoid or belonging to a 
different fauna) extraterrestrials would be sentient. How then would the sentient 
human being be differentiated from other non-human sentient beings, since they 
all have the right to their own technological perfection? Probably in the desire 
for perfection that technological intelligence would mostly satisfy. It can be 
deducted that animals and artificial intelligence would not thus far have this 
decision-making autonomy, but would benefit from it thanks to the intervention 
of human subjects. Ergo, the subject is he who chooses to apply the procedures 
and products of technoscience to exceed himself. 
 
 
The Subject in transition 
 
This self-renewing act of perfectioning defines a new status for the human being. 
It is this very decision-making ability that differentiates it from animals and 
artificial intelligence; on the other hand, we cannot express an opinion on 
extraterrestrials. The idea of subject seems to be recovering its old uniformity, 
now guaranteed by this decisional right to “reprogram itself”, both at the 
physical and psychological level. It is a subject that creates itself, or, better still, 
re-creates itself, because it does not like the way it was born. It is a subject that 
beats ageing, and perhaps even death. It continuously improves itself, no longer 
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in order to reach its own arete, moral virtue par excellence, but to exceed all 
limits imposed by nature. Its own self-improvement obeys mainly a physical 
sphere which, thanks to new technologies, regenerates itself. This means that the 
space for educational intervention which we were accustomed to radically 
changes. Education would have dilated its own technical potential through 
effective technological intervention. Transformation is no longer the result of 
long, patient educational processes, but rather the technical manipulation of 
body, mind, and psyche. This self-renewing decisionality is the most recent 
produce of technological rationality. The subject is a technological rational being 
(R. Queraltó, 2008), which limitlessly operates on itself and on humanity. Ergo, 
it can legitimally intervene in the very structure of life, and bring about epochal 
changes over the course of a few years. 
Nonetheless, if rationality hereby finds its defining, almost ontological, 
empire, corporeality recovers a renewed protagonism. It becomes the very matter 
on which technical reason acts in order to optimize performance, beyond the 
boundaries of age and life itself, as it has been conceived up to the present day. 
The body becomes a technological object, thus losing its original and individual 
uniqueness. Then we all can become strong, attractive and immortal, regardless 
of our genetics and talents, according to such schemes as contemporary science 
develops for our happiness. Indeed, Max Moore claims that “death is an 
imposition on race that can no longer be tolerated, while Kevin Davis goes so far 
as stating that “we must rewrite God´s language”1.  
In this context, education seems to lose importance due to its lengthiness and 
hazard of subjectivity that always escapes determinisms. Why study, cultivate 
one’s own spirituality or refine one’s sensitivity? Why train to improve, and to 
cultivate a mens sana in corpore sano, when technology intervenes to correct 
and define a sentient being into a being capable of beating even nature’s absurd 
imposition to die? Genetic engineering can be made responsible for 
manufacturing beautiful, intelligent, strong and psychologically well-oriented 
offspring. Yet, who evaluates the degree of beauty, intelligence, and 
psychological sanity? The parents or some elected experts? Scientists? Or the 
“sentient” subject when it acquires the ability to make decisions? Perhaps the 
perfectly programmed fetus, with its maximum transhuman potentials, will have 
a different conception of beauty, intelligence and psychological sanity to that of 
its programmers. Ergo, it will be able to intervene, and reprogram itself with the 
aid of the right technology and the adequate procedures.   
                                                          
1 Cfr. “Estinzione degli sciocchi e figli forti, attraenti. Ecco il transumanismo”, Edited by Il Foglio, 
March 2005 
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Teaching good manners and the abc becomes redundant. The body is the 
testing field of technical reason. The self-renewing decision goes through the 
body, manipulable matter and host to a psyche that can and must be technically 
programmed. Technology, and no longer education, is now the contemporary 
Prometheus’ forge. Technology also arrogantly enters the definition of Subject 
designed by the transhumanist school of thought. The body becomes the dynamic 
structure of the subject, as the latter intervenes on the former to perfect it. While 
before the Subjects procedurality and pluralism were determined by the Relation, 
as ontological principle, now, said procedurality is determined by the Subject’s 
technological will to self-constitute. Is it more free? This paper argues that it is 
“differently” free, on the condition of understanding the meaning, nature and 
direction of technoscientific dynamism. Even once this condition is fulfilled, the 
subject will be free to make decisions regarding its improvement through 
technique – finance permitting –, but will nonetheless be “delivered” into the 
hands of technocratic officials, specialists who will operate on him/her with the 
right technologies, and to whom he/she will hand over his/her body, mind, and 
psyche. The procedural relationality that determines the transhumanist Subject 
depend, above all else, on the technical control of specialists. Technical reason, 
the mature product of the latest technoscience, turns the body into its field of 
action to forge the man and woman of the future. The transhuman Subject agrees 
to its self-determination through the technological acting of a rationality which 
turns the body and the psyche – which it reaches by acting on the body itself – 
into a battlefield of its self-experimenting. The Subject-foundation that 
postmodernism has dissolved into procedural relationality and complexity 
dynamics, can now be defined as the ability to continuously self-create. The new 
criteria are those of technical rationality that delivers the decision-making of the 
self-creating Subject into the hands of the technology official, he who carries out 
suitable procedures with appropriate instruments, and the corresponding 
finances. New, previously inconceivable opportunities arise. As well as new 
risks. New freedoms and new captivities evoke the hazard of the ancient hýbris 
(βρις). 
Heidegger (1983) claims that what is truly worrying is not that the world may 
turn into the sole domain of technique, but rather that man is not prepared for this 
radical mutation of the world. In other words: what is more disturbing is that we 
are not yet capable of reaching, through a mediating thought, an appropriate 
confrontation with what is actually emerging in our era. 
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Considerations for the immediate future 
 
The subject of the world of the future will have to be highly technology-literate, 
will need to know the technoscientific languages and logics that have forged 
his/her world, and, perhaps, his/her humanity. Why is that, if there will be 
technocrats who will intervene on his/her psyche, mind, genes, etc., according to 
their specialization? To understand what is happening around him/her, to be able 
to orient him/herself in the world he/she lives in, and to make cognitive choices. 
The Subject of the future will have to be a supracompetent hermeneutic in order 
to “reveal” the hidden suasione of scientific rethoric, and undo the 
technoscientific and sci-fi tales that fill his/her imagination. Why? To be more 
free. Or, in other words, to rule his/her own mind. To decide what to do of 
him/herself after having understood what he/she is and what that wonderful 
adventure we call technology is. Because answering the immediate question 
“what is technology for?” is useless if one ignores its nature, does not know what 
it is and how we conceive it. And to ask oneself such questions, one needs a 
philosophical mind. Free and plural thought. An education that can trace 
significance processes among the various domains of knowledge. Technocratic 
literacy, so widely praised by Western educational practices, is not in itself 
enough to understand the meaning of science and technology. Nor to understand 
their contemporary purpose, and existential significance they hold before our 
eyes. Technocratic training eludes the lengthy times of profound comprehension 
of phenomena. Therefore, a useful scientific education cannot forego a solid 
humanistic basis: “I do not call technique, but simple practice, the activity which 
cannot rationally explain the nature of its object nor of its instrument, and, 
incapable of making sense of facts, is absolutely unfitted to connect them to their 
cause” (Plato, Gorgias, 465a). Because: “Tèchne derives from héxis nou, which 
means: owning and disposing of one’s own mind” (Plato, Cratylus, 414b-c). 
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